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EXCISE B

B1, EB

FRIDAY
AUGUST 20, 1954

Guy de Carmoy came to see me this morning about the translation of a pamphlet [redacted] he had prepared to point out the dangers of a rearmament of Germany in any other fashion than as a member of EDC.

Frank White of Time Magazine came to see me, [redacted] gloomy over the future if EDC fails.

I had lunch alone with Margaret Biddle. She says Pinay will do anything he can, even in a last-ditch fight in the Assembly, to have the present text of the Treaty approved.

Jim Hunt came around this afternoon and I discussed the Carmoy pamphlet with him.

Everywhere I went on my recent trip, doubt was expressed as to the firmness of the British position on EDC.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY LEC DATE 7-1-81
PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

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A disturbing telegram arrived this afternoon from Brussels reading:

"FROM: BRUSSELS.

"ACTION: PARIS 53 Aug 20 2 PM
Washington

"Paris NIACT for Bruce.

"Mendès-France told Ministers this morning that he had just received message from Secretary Dulles stating it was imperative conference reach agreement at once and that United States would accept any agreement they reached. Point came up on question of returning to parliaments.

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"Above told us in confidence. Please advise Tomlinson NIACT. Delegations disbelieve statement but are very nervous. ALGER."

I called Livie Merchant in Washington. He said it referred to an EYES ONLY telegram sent by Dulles yesterday to Dillon and I should get a copy of it from the Code Room in the Embassy.

This EYES ONLY telegram was as follows:

"FROM: WASHINGTON.

"ACTION: PARIS 632, August 19, 8 P.M.

"Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary.

"FYI: Following memo of conversation dictated by Secretary:

"'André Meyer came to see me at 4:30 yesterday. He said that he had talked personally with Mendès-France the evening before. Mendès-France had been particularly upset because he inferred from the cabled message, which I had sent via Dillon, that I had lost confidence in his personal integrity and determination really to try to push EDC through.

"'Meyer then gave me a long letter from Mendès-France, addressed to me, explaining his reasons for acting as he was. This letter, in substance, covered the same ground as had been covered by his statements to Dillon.

"'Meyer also said that Mendès-France had pointed out the great difficulties under which he was laboring, that he was surrounded by people who were anti-EDC, that he himself did not have time to replace them, and this meant that he had to try to do much of the technical work personally. He was very critical of the prior government for having, on the one hand, pretended to espouse the EDC and, on the other hand, allowed to stay in the Foreign Office the strongest opponents of EDC. This confronted Mendès-France with a very difficult technical situation.

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"' I told Meyer that I had no doubt whatever of Mendès-France's intellectual honesty and good intentions. However, I felt that he was ill-advised and did not appreciate the gravity of the situation.

"'Meyer indicated that Mendès-France had the impression that it was the United States which was instigating opposition to his plan on the part of the Low Countries and Germany. I denied that the United States had made any effort at all to create opposition and said that anything Mendès-France and Adenauer could agree on would almost automatically have our approval. It was, however, my impression that Mendès-France's proposals could not be accepted by Adenauer, and if he tried to take them he would be defeated in his own Parliamentary bodies, and that would mark the end of the last German with whom France could negotiate an organic unity which would prevent a repetition of the past.

"'I reviewed the past history and pointed out that what was going on was apparently nothing but the repetition of the old cycle. Over a year ago, there had been the "protocols", which France had insisted upon as essential to ratification. These had been agreed to by the other five. Then there had come the Soviet proposal and the French demand that there must be a meeting on Germany before they could act. That meeting had been held fruitlessly, but still there was no French action. Then Britain and the U. S. were told that they had to make firmer and more far-reaching engagements. These were given on the explicit understanding that the matter would at once be put to a vote but nothing had happened. Now we were starting again with new protocols, a new meeting with Soviet Russia about Germany and requests for further U.S.-U.K. guarantees. Mendès-France could hardly be surprised if the friends and allies of France felt that France had lost the capacity for effective action, and they could not be reassured by Mendès-France's mere words at a time when in fact what he was doing was merely a repetition of

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the futile past. Meanwhile, time was running out, particularly in Germany, and we were threatened with stark disaster.

"'Meyer asked what he should say to Mendès-France, and I told him that he could repeat in substance what I had said to him.' DULLES."

I had hardly digested this when Tommy called me from Brussels and said de Staercke would like me to come no at once. I dashed to the airport, found the Sabena plane would have a two-hour delay, crossed town rapidly and caught the train as it was pulling out of the station.

I arrived at 10:30 and went directly to the Embassy, where I found André, Tommy and Art Hartman awaiting me. They said things were in terrible confusion.

I drove down to the Foreign Office, where I had a long talk with Mr. Spaak during an interval of the Conference. He has already presented the declaration of which he spoke to us earlier in the week, but there is no indication it will be acceptable to Mendès, who still insists that at least 80 percent of his Protocol be adopted.

We returned to the Embassy and busied ourselves with various messages, incoming and outgoing. I sent Tommy to Roland de Margerie to pass on to Mendès the information we had received from Washington about the true nature of the conversation between Foster and André Meyer (repeated by the latter, presumably via telegram, to Mendès), and to tell Mendès we would do whatever we could, and he desired, to dispel the misunderstanding that seemed to have arisen over his references to a message from Dulles.

About one o'clock, the Conference having broken up for the night with no real progress having been made, Mendès sent for Tommy to call on him at the French Embassy. This Tommy did, and I went off to bed at the Astoria.

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